The beginning of the XIX century. The city of Algiers... The port has been closed for several days now, and the streets, markets and squares are busier than usual. The privateers are about to embark on their next voyage. Whoever was their prey this time, the captured ship would be brought to port and the crew sold as slaves. Light and fast vessels are already equipped and are in the harbor. Every Moor or kulugli (descendant of a Turk and a local woman) who is familiar with maritime affairs is required to appear on the orders of the Rais (captains). In vain do some people try to evade, citing a large family, age, or the need to do other things; the Rais are adamant. Anyone who tries to escape is almost certainly going to die. The janissaries will also take part in the campaign: after all, some ships belong to the Dey of Algiers himself (the ruler who was elected at the council of janissary officers from 1671 to 1830), others are the property of the state and merchants...

Cannon shots rang out, the signal for departure. The flotilla sails. The ships have a large yard span and wide sails, providing speed and maneuverability to skillfully approach the enemy vessel and board it. Privateers use cannon fire only when absolutely necessary: you can sink the coveted prize. Shots are fired again as the squadron passes the dey's palace. The crowd gathered on the pier sees off the corsairs with cheers...

A similar pattern has been observed in the ports of Algeria, Tunis, and Tripoli for several centuries. The courage of the corsairs was legendary. Fast-moving vessels of the "Barbarians", as Europeans then called the inhabitants of North Africa, plowed the expanses of the Mediterranean Sea and went out into the Atlantic Ocean, sometimes reaching England, Ireland and even Iceland. In the era of so-called primitive accumulation, piracy was widely used by many Powers. England, France, and the Netherlands used filibusters to plunder Spanish possessions in America. Later, he received the practice of legalized sea robbery-privateering. The three North African regencies of the Turkish sultan - Algeria, Tunis and Tripoli, led by their beys (in Algeria - deys) - did not stand aside from him. At the beginning of the 19th century corsairism lost its former significance for Tunisia, but it was still important for Algeria. Tunisia was economically ahead of its neighbors, and trade prevailed there over corsairism. In Algeria, economic and social progress was more hindered by the predatory nature of the policies of the top janissary corps, which were alien to the Arab-Berber population and lived primarily on the proceeds of piracy. The Ottoman regencies fought long-term naval wars with European states, although they gradually yielded to them.

The policy of the European powers in relation to the" Barbarians "was not determined by" outbursts of indignation " against pirates, as bourgeois historiography writes, but by purely commercial interests or mutual rivalry .1 After all, European corsairs, in turn, enjoyed the direct patronage of crowned heads, starting with Elizabeth I of England. The governments of England and France now found it more advantageous to sign bilateral agreements with the Ottoman regencies, ensuring that their ships would be able to operate safely.-

1 For more information, see: Julien S. A. History of North Africa. Tunis, Algeria, Morocco. Vol. 2. Moscow, 1961, p. 121.

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safe navigation in the Mediterranean would be preferable, while rival merchant ships would continue to be attacked. From 1805 to 1815 88 merchant ships were captured by Janissary pirates .2 After the end of the Napoleonic Wars, when piracy in the Mediterranean Sea revived, the problem of" Barbarians " acquired pan-European significance. At that time, international relations developed primarily within the framework of contacts between England, Austria, Russia and Prussia. North African piracy has become one of the issues that were more often solved before by the powers alone, and now - in systems of alliances.

Initially, England did not show much interest in fighting him. Admiral W. S. Smith, who proposed in 1814 to create an international fleet to fight the "barbarians", allegedly acted on his own initiative, so that officially the British government did not stand behind him. In 1816, however, it commissioned two naval expeditions under the command of Admiral Lord Exmouth, aimed at eliminating Mediterranean piracy. British bourgeois historiography was unable (or unwilling) to clearly explain the reasons that prompted England to change course towards the Algerian Regency at that time. After all, its positions in the Mediterranean were quite strong: unlike Denmark, Sweden, and a number of other states, England did not pay tribute to the regencies and was limited to monetary gifts for each change of its consul under dey 3 . Relations with Algeria were regulated by a series of treaties of peace and trade, and the British consuls enjoyed considerable influence over the rulers of Algeria and Tripoli. Osler argued that the London government's actions were based on altruistic motives and that Exmouth was defending "the interests of the civilized world" .4 Without dwelling in more detail on the falsity of this thesis in principle, we will only mention that these authors, even from a purely factual point of view, lack a comprehensive approach to the problem: they consider the Exmouth campaigns only as a fact of English naval history or as a fact of the history of North Africa. Few (A. Debidour, H. Schenck, J.-A. Pirenne) tried to look at the actions of Exmouth through the prism of the then international relations .5 Debidour reasonably believed that England was seeking to take the fight against the "Barbarians" into its own hands in order to strengthen its position in the Mediterranean; a particular role was played by the deterioration of relations with Tripoli in 1815, when several English ships were robbed by local corsairs. The Anglo-American War of 1812-1814 had just ended, and London was looking with alarm at the active actions of the Americans: the US squadron under the command of Commodore S. Decatur in June 1815 dealt a strong blow to the Algerian fleet. "His Majesty's Parliament" was concerned to show that it was Great Britain that "decided the case" in the Mediterranean.

Admiral Exmouth, who had served in the New World, India and Europe, and since 1811 had commanded a squadron in the Mediterranean, was ordered in early 1816 to visit the regency capitals, demand recognition of the British protectorate over the Ionian Islands, which were ceded to England by the Congress of Vienna, and persuade the North African rulers to abolish slavery for Christian prisoners. He was also instructed to offer his services as an intermediary to any State that wished to make peace with the "Barbarians" .6 Exmouth was able to fulfill part of the program, because the kingdoms of Naples and Sardinia readily responded to the latter offer, all three regencies signed peace with these states and recognized the British protectorate over the Ionian Islands. Then Exmouth managed to get the beys of Tunis and Tripoli to agree to the abolition of slavery for Christians. The situation was more complicated with Algeria.

2 Darey J. France et Angleterre. Cent annees de rivalite coloniale d'Afrique. P. 1904, p. 44.

3 The gift usually amounted to 600 pounds (Qalibert M. L. Histoire d'Alger ancien et modern. P. 1843, p. 240)

4 Walpole S. History of England from the Conclusion of Great War in 1815. Vol. 1. Lnd. 1879, p. 229; Osier E. The Life of Admiral Viscount Exmouth. Lnd. 1835, pp. 306 - 339.

5 Debidur A. Diplomatic history of Europe. Vol. 1. M. 1947; Schenk H. G. The Aftermath of the Napoleonic Wars. Lnd. 1947; Pirenne J.-H. La Sainte Alliance. T. II. P. 1949.

6 Osler E. Op. cit., p. 293.

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Since 1815, the dey was replaced by a former janissary aga (general). Omar, a capable administrator and visionary politician. Unlike the previous dey, he tried to improve relations with the Port and promised Sultan Mahmud II to stop attacks on Russian, Venetian and Austrian ships. However, Omar did not intend to completely abandon corsairism and the conversion of Christians into slavery, and therefore tried to interest the sultan in this.: "Whatever belongs to a servant belongs to his master." 7 When Exmouth's squadron anchored off the Algerian coast on May 15, 1816, the admiral's above-mentioned demands were rejected by the Divan (Council of State under the Government). Exmouth gave two hours to think and threatened to bombard the city if he refused, while he himself, accompanied by Consul Macdonell, set out from the Dey's palace for the port, but was detained by the janissaries on the way. They released Exmouth, and left the consul as a hostage. The admiral, as soon as he stepped on the deck of the ship, gave the order to prepare for an attack. The wind blowing from the shore prevented the ships from taking a favorable position, which delayed the skirmish. Then the parties decided to refer the issue to the Sultan for consideration. Dey's envoy was to visit Constantinople and then take Mahmud II's reply to London.

While the British military pressure on the "Barbarians" was moderate, Exmouth, which almost decided to bomb Algeria, exceeded its authority. In a letter to his family, he asked them to remain silent about the events during the expedition. The Admiral honestly told them that his active actions would not be in line with the commercial interests of England .8 Indeed, the prevailing opinion in London at that time was that the corsairism of the "Barbarians" was beneficial, which caused damage to the trade of competing countries. However, after Exmouth returned to London, news came that on May 23, 1816, Italian fishermen and coral fishermen living near the North African town of Bon (now Annaba) were attacked by janissaries and almost all were killed, and the Janissaries threw in the dust and tore up the British flag, under the protection of which the Italian village was located. - they looted the vice-consul's house and arrested him. It is not known whether the Bey of Bon, whose dependence on the Dey of Algiers was illusory, acted independently or on Omar's orders. But this event was an occasion to settle England's scores with Algeria and to demonstrate that London is the master of the Mediterranean.

The Anglo-Russian commercial and political rivalry must not be overlooked. After 1815, the demand for Russian agricultural raw materials in Europe increased dramatically. In 1811-1815, it exported 9.069 million pounds of grain, and in 1816-1820 - 29.655 million pounds, mainly through the Black Sea ports .9 The Russian Black Sea fleet was small, and trade was conducted mainly with the help of Greek ships under the Russian flag. Since grain was an important export item for the regencies, pirates did not miss the opportunity to rob the ships of a competitor. London sometimes allowed Russian ships to sail under an English convoy, but did not take on the protection of stragglers, and sometimes refused to request a convoy at all. In St. Petersburg, they understood that it was difficult to count on punitive expeditions against pirates without the participation of the English fleet. Alexander I, in a letter to the English Foreign Secretary, Lord Castlereagh, proposed the creation of a union of states to protect shipping from pirates. 11 However, the prospect of the Russian fleet appearing in the Mediterranean, even as part of an international squadron, alarmed London, and they rejected the tsar's proposal, saying that it would be more expedient if each state itself provided protection for its ships. At the same time, the British government launched a diversionary maneuver. In May 1816, in a conversation with the Russian ambassador in London, H. A. Lieven Castlereagh, having stipulated the" special relations " of his country with the regencies, proposed to include the issue of sanctions against corsairs in the agenda of the conference on the abolition of the slave trade convened in London: if the conference offers England a role in the abolition of the slave trade,-

7 Temimi A. Documents turcs inedits sur Ie bombardement d'Alger en 1816. -Revue de I'Occident Musulman et de la Me- diterrarmee, Aix-en-Provence, 1968. N 5, p. 119.

8 Osler E. Op. cit., p. 303.

9 Pokrovskiy S. A. Vneshnee torgovaya i vneshnee torgovaya politika Rossii [Foreign Trade and Foreign Trade Policy of Russia]. Moscow, 1947, p. 246.

10 Foreign policy of Russia in the 19th and early 20th centuries. Documents of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (hereinafter referred to as VPR). Series one, Vol. VIII, Moscow, 1972, p. 134.

11 Ibid. Second series, vol. I (IX), Moscow, 1974, p. 113.

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If the Barbarians rejected mediation, then the former might "find it necessary to join forces with the forces of other powers for hostile actions against pirates" 12 . While this idea was being discussed, London tried to manage to solve the case differently, putting other countries in front of a fait accompli. A new expedition was equipped under the command of Exmouth. On July 28, 1816, the admiral hoisted his flag on the 100-gun ship Queen Charlotte and sailed from Plymouth at the head of 19 ships, including five ships of the line. Exmouth wanted to attack Algiers from the sea with battleships, providing the operation from the rear with other vessels. The Admiralty was surprised, since even G. Nelson considered it necessary to use at least 25 ships of the line for a siege bombardment of this city .13 But Exmouth was based on intelligence: at the beginning of 1816, on his orders, Captain Ward secretly examined the pier, the lighthouse and made a plan for the coastal defenses of the city, which now allowed the admiral to accurately determine the location of his ships.

Memories of the second campaign of Exmouth, written by its translator, a Lebanese Christian A. Salame, have been preserved. From them it is clear that during the leaky period of the entire campaign, training shots were constantly conducted, and after the passage through the Strait of Gibraltar, Exmouth ordered the decks to be cleared of foreign objects and the guns to be uncovered .14 Meanwhile, the British government was trying to give the expedition the character of a "collective event", for which purpose, in Gibraltar, several ships of the Dutch Admiral Ya. Van Capellen ships that were built as early as the beginning of 1816 to protect merchant ships in the Netherlands 15 . On August 27, the fleet approached Algiers - a beautiful, built-up white-stone buildings and well-protected: on its pier and in the forts there were up to 1 thousand guns. True, many of them were still from the time of the famous corsair of the XVI century. Hayreddin Barbarossa. Exmouth sent a boat with officers and an interpreter to the city, ordering the parliamentarians not to go ashore, but to transmit an ultimatum to the Algerian boat with a long pole. The answer was given no more than three hours. The following demands were made to the Dey: the abolition of Christian slavery; the release without ransom of all European slaves; the return of the sums paid by Naples and Sardinia for their subjects already redeemed from slavery; the conclusion by Algeria of peace with the Netherlands on the same terms as with England; the release of Consul Macdonell .16
While the negotiations were being held, the English fleet was less than a mile from the coastal defenses. As soon as the "No response" signal was raised on the boat with the parliamentarians after the time limit expired, the ships undertook combat movements. "Queen Charlotte", passing by the Algerian batteries, stood at the entrance to the port in such a way as to shoot through the pier along its entire length. Not only did the Algerians not fire a single shot at the British flagship, but their guns were not loaded at all. Meanwhile, the fleet of 40 Algerian ships also began to be built in battle order. Their movements were observed by a group of citizens gathered on the pier. Curious people expected that this time, as it happened in May, everything would be limited to a military demonstration, but they were the first victims of military operations. From the volleys of English ships, many citizens were killed 17 . The janissaries resisted fiercely, and the dead gunners were replaced by new ones. It was particularly hot near the lighthouse battery, where Dey Omar hoisted his red, white, and yellow flag. He also ordered the Minister of the Navy to be beheaded, accusing him of poor command.

When the mole batteries were silenced half an hour later, the main attack of the British and Dutch was transferred to the Algerian ships. One of them caught fire, broke anchor and almost set fire to the "Queen Charlotte". After concentrating fire on a group of Turkish frigates, they also burst into flames. By evening, the last batteries had been suppressed, and only a few forts in the center of the city were still firing back. Around midnight

12 Ibid., p. 168.

13 Walpole S. Op. cit., p. 232.

14 Salame A. The Narrative of Expedition to Algiers in the Yeart 1816. Lnd. 1819, pp. 5, 8 - 9.

15 In the literature, the Dutch squadron is sometimes mistakenly referred to as the Danish squadron (Proshin N. I. Istoriya Livii v novoe vremya, Moscow 1981, p. 133).

16 Salame A. Op. cit., p. 21.

17 Annual Register, or a View of History... for the Year 1816. Lnd. 1817, p. 101.

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Exmouth pulled away from the shore. As soon as his fleet was anchored, a terrible storm broke out with heavy rain. But even the torrents of water did not extinguish the flames on the Algerian ships. The British and Dutch lost about 900 men killed and wounded, and several of their ships were damaged. The loss of Algerians, including civilians, ranged from four to eight thousand people .18 The next day, Day accepted Exmouth's ultimatum and even had to publicly apologize to McDonell, freed more than 1,500 Christian slaves (and in total, 3 thousand slaves were freed for both Exmouth campaigns), and returned $ 357 thousand. To the Kingdom of Naples and 25.5 thousand to Sardinia. It is significant that Exmouth did not raise the issue of stopping piracy and responded positively to Omar's request to guarantee non-interference of England in military conflicts between Algeria and other states. 19
In London, the results of the expedition were met with satisfaction. The admiral was granted the title of viscount, and the Lord Mayor of the capital presented him with a diamond-encrusted sword. Castlereagh in the House of Commons spoke of the" brilliant results " of the campaign 20 . St. Petersburg held a different position. Russian State Secretary for Foreign Affairs Igor Kapodistrias stressed that Britain has moved away from the promised collective solution to issue 21 . The London Conference of 1816, at which Castlereagh again "pushed" the issue of ending piracy, was also unsuccessful in this sense .22 Thus, England "punished" Dey for disobedience and strengthened its political position in the Mediterranean, while maintaining the same attitude to the problem of trade and piracy. Not by chance F. Engels assessed Exmouth's actions as a measure of punishment for the Algerians .23 Indeed, London was not interested in defeating the regencies, as Castlereagh frankly admitted to the Prussian diplomat H. Bernstorff.

Russian diplomacy then succeeded in insisting on discussing the issue of piracy at the Aachen Congress of Powers in the autumn of 1818. The powers agreed there that France and England would "seriously warn" the regencies against corsairism. 25 However, despite the respective assurances of the regencies, their pirate ships still went to sea. Until 1827, they captured 26 more ships .26 And only the Battle of Navarino in 1827, in which the combined fleet of the Ports and Regencies was defeated by the Russian - Anglo-French squadron, dealt a serious blow to the corsairs ' actions in the Mediterranean.

18 According to Algerian sources (Temimi A. Op. cit., p. 129), the British and Dutch lost up to three thousand, the Algerians - up to 300 people.

19 Salame A. Op. cit., p. 151.

20 Parliamentary Debates, ist ser" vol. XXXV, Lnd., 1817, p, 177).

21 VLOOKUP, vol. I. (IX) pp. 240-241.

22 Ibid., p. 297.

23 See; K. Marx and F. Engels Soch. Vol. 14, p. 103.

24 Woolf L. Empire and Commerce in Africa. A Study in Economic Imperialism. Lnd. 1919, p. 73.

25 VPR. Vol. II (X). M. 1976, p. 581.

26 Darcy J. Op. cit., p. 43.

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