How to feed a soldier in the North Caucasus

Over the past 20 years, our country's Armed Forces have participated in numerous armed conflicts both within and outside our country.

The experience accumulated over the years in providing food for troops participating in local wars and carrying out peacekeeping missions is generally specific and therefore cannot serve as a basis for organizing food supply for troops in large-scale combat operations. However, it can be successfully applied in a tactical manner.

The provision of troops included in the Operational Group of Federal Troops (forces) in the North Caucasus, was planned from warehouses and bases of the center, from suppliers under the orders of the Central Food Department of the Russian Ministry of Defense, warehouses of the North Caucasus Military District, local suppliers and military state farms of the North Caucasus Military District.

At the first stage, due to the lack of sufficient storage capacities, the accumulation of food supplies was carried out in the military warehouses of several units. There was a huge additional burden on these parts. After all, they had to provide in addition to their own large number of" foreign " personnel. During the fighting, food products were also accumulated in rented areas and in the warehouses of the Military Trade Center in the North Caucasus. This made it possible to maintain stocks in each direction for the main types of food for 20-30 days, including 3 daily dry ration cottages (individual food ration).

To meet the full demand of the group for fresh potatoes and vegetables for 8 months, more than 6,000 tons of potatoes and vegetables worth over 36 million rubles were harvested by the North Caucasus Military District. The potatoes were harvested and stored in fresh and canned form (other vegetables, except for onions, were stored in canned form).

During the movement of the troops, a serious problem arose: due to the constant movement with short stops, as well as the lack of professional skills among the service personnel, particularly the cooks, hot food was not always prepared in the combat units. Instead, the troops were provided with the so-called dry rations, which were expensive. However, our military personnel were able to fully appreciate the various options of the dry rations, and these new rations were highly praised. In terms of taste, food composition and energy value, domestic developments, by the way, are in many ways superior to NATO's "military cooking". A positive result consists of the following factors: reduced volume, ease of transportation, loading, storage, transfer from one military unit to another, savings, availability of a full range of products for the entire day. At the same time, accounting and reporting are simplified to the limit. To prepare food using, for example, group diets, you do not need to be a cook at all. Once you've seen it, everything is clear without any instructions: just take it and delight your soldier's (officer's) stomach. At the end of the tests, after minor modifications, it was proposed to introduce group rations into the structure of military food supplies and provide them to personnel for a special period. To the delight of food service specialists and everyone else interested, draft resolutions of the Government of the Russian Federation "On the Implementation of Food Rations for Wartime" and "On the Implementation of a New Structure for Military Food Supplies" have already been prepared.

And now a few drops of tar about how much it costs. With the beginning of the operation, the troops were, as the food specialists say, served with more than 600 thousand sets of individual and group rations, of which a little more than 500 thousand were spent (for the sum of more than 69 million rubles), including IRP - about 360 thousand sets, which accounted for more than 17 percent of their total consumption. This generous approach leads to increased food costs, as the new delicious IRP is more than 5 times more expensive than the traditional military ration. However, in order to ensure the uninterrupted supply of food to the troops, it was necessary to create and maintain in readiness for shipment (in addition to what is shipped to the SKVO warehouses): up to 150,000 sets of IRP (SRP), up to 150 tons of long-term bread, and up to 60 tons of Army bread.up to 2 tons of yeast with a long shelf life (up to 2 years).

Frequent changes in the areas of assignment and a lack of regular transport sometimes made it impossible to arrive on time.

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replenish supplies. Therefore, food supplies were delivered directly to the combat formations by the district's vehicles: combined convoys with security were formed, and helicopters were used. Due to the constant movement of troops, the distance of food delivery increased every day, reaching 150-200 km from stationary storage bases. However, the main task was accomplished: the personnel of the formations and units were provided with three meals a day, including hot food, and the units directly involved in combat operations were provided with daily (individual) rations. Small teams of 5 to 10 people, who performed tasks independently, were provided with food for 10 days.

It should be noted that the troops use trailer-mounted kitchens such as the KP-125 (adopted in 1965), KP-130 (1978), and the PAK-200 automobile kitchen (1972) for cooking. However, experience in combat situations has shown that these "dinosaurs" do not meet the requirements of the troops, especially when operating in mountainous terrain (due to their low maneuverability, narrow track width, high center of gravity, lack of adjustable trailer devices, low cargo capacity, and insufficient reliability).

But the lessons of Chechnya have not been in vain. The obtained performance characteristics have made it possible to introduce design changes to the projected trailer kitchen in order to improve its stability, reliability and unreliability in operation, as well as to increase the convenience of repair and maintenance, the possibilities of its transportation by any transport traction means. Improved parameters of habitability, created relatively comfortable conditions for the work of chefs. The design has a block-modular design, which allows you to cook food not only on the kitchen equipment, but also on individual blocks of the kitchen, using a multifunctional nozzle that works on diesel fuel, gasoline, gas, and ... on coal and firewood. The presence of blocks allows you to organize hot meals in three units at once (each up to 60 people). And you won't have to carry buckets of borscht and porridge two or three miles away, as is done when food is prepared on trailer kitchens. In addition, the design provides for a retractable frame dining room, allowing for the organization of meals for command staff of units of up to 10 people. This kitchen is planned to be adopted for the provision of troops in 2000. So, soon, land commanders will have a cozy field mess hall.

As always in war, the issue of providing personnel with bread was problematic. Civilian bakeries in North Ossetia and Dagestan may have wanted to provide the entire military group with bread. However, the large distance from the group and the inability to quickly solve this problem using the standard transport (the AFH-53 bread van is designed to transport 1 daily ration of bread) prevented the daily delivery of bread to the troops. As a result, bread had to be loaded into large but open trucks. They brought it to the front lines for 3 to 4 days, but it had a bitter taste of Chechen dust, to put it mildly. The frontline soldiers tactfully asked the food service specialists to stop this practice. In response to their requests, specially trained personnel began packaging the loaves in plastic bags.

Of course, the main option for the uninterrupted supply of bread to the military in war is, as it is officially called, the deployment of regular bread-making facilities. And this was done, and in a relatively short time. But still, it was partly necessary to "go for bread" to the nearest civilian bakeries. Centralized deliveries of Army bread and long-term bread preserved with heat also helped out. Thus, only during the fighting in the territory of the Republic of Dagestan were delivered: long-term bread-about 95 tons, "Army" bread, crackers and biscuits-more than 157 tons, which was about 12 percent of the troops ' needs.

By the way, if someone thinks that the field bakeries developed in the 50s that are in service with the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation meet the modern requirements of the troops, then no-they are morally and physically outdated, have low productivity, a low degree of mechanization, are sedentary and require considerable time to prepare for work. For the last 5 years, they have not been purchased by the Russian Armed Forces. Not that there is no money: if you really pay - so for the thing! Therefore, a fundamentally new mobile bakery plant is currently being developed in containers with self-loading devices that allow it to be installed and transported by any means of transport. It does not require any preparatory operations or time for deployment or collapse. The prototype of the mobile bakery plant is planned to be manufactured in the second half of 2000.

But, as they say, it's not just about bread. The organization of drinking water supply remains the most pressing issue. This is a collaborative effort involving engineering, chemical, medical, and food services, as well as the logistics departments of military units and formations.

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For many years, there has been a question of determining a single general customer responsible for the exploration, production, purification, and delivery of water. Today, it is widely believed that the Food Service is responsible for water supply, although it is only the customer for the technical means of storing and transporting water...

The lack of funds for water transportation and storage, as well as the absence of a system for preserving water in the field and delivering it to difficult-to-access areas, are also disadvantages of water supply.

With the outbreak of hostilities, the tanks were removed from the chassis of the AZPT-4.1 (based on the ZIL-130) and AVTs-1.7 (based on the GAZ-66) and installed in the bodies of the Ural and KamAZ vehicles. The practice of using the Ural-4320 as a tractor to deliver water using the TSV-50 or TSV-1.2 trailer tanks with a capacity of 1,000 to 1,200 liters has proven to be ineffective. Additionally, using these water delivery vehicles requires an increase in the number of trips and drivers. As a positive fact, it should be noted that during the combat operations, a water supply platoon consisting of 7 ATsPT-4.7 water tankers and 6 TsV-1.2 trailers was added to the staff of one of the motor brigades of the North Caucasus Military District.

The problem of delivering drinking water to personnel in mountainous conditions also requires attention. Today, paratroopers (airborne assault troops) are partially equipped with RDV-12 and RDV-100 water delivery tanks, but this issue has not been fully resolved. However, the experience of delivering water to personnel in mountainous conditions, which was used in Afghanistan, can be applied. At the initiative of the Central Food Administration of the Ministry of Defense, water was dropped from helicopters to the troops, packaged in improvised rubber-and-fabric materials (such as fire hoses). The Mujahideen's method of transporting food and water in the mountains is also noteworthy: they used native horses, specifically the hardy Afghan ponies.

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In the future, it will be advisable to include 0.125 liters of silver-ionated water (with a shelf life of 4 years) in each meal for personnel operating in areas with water shortages.

In the mountainous and desert terrain, the so-called automotive equipment for the national economy, which is mainly equipped with special equipment (ACPT-5.0 based on the ZIL-130, AFI, AFC, and AFX based on the GAZ-53), proved to be insufficient. However, the specialists of the Central Food Administration were able to overcome this challenge by developing new means of transporting food and water on the chassis of all-terrain vehicles, with prototypes to be produced in 2000.

The training of specialists remains a serious problem. For example, the issue of training chefs and bakers in military cook schools has not been fully resolved. The quality of training is a particular concern. Additionally, the availability of personnel is a significant issue. In many military districts (naval forces), more than half of the chefs are female military personnel. As a result, there is a severe shortage of "combat cooks" when military units are deployed to the Joint Forces. Apparently, it's high time, at least in the permanent readiness units, for men to replace women in the kitchen...

And yet, the fact remains that, despite the many challenges, the food supply for the military personnel of the Joint Group of Federal Forces (forces) in the North Caucasus was organized at the proper level. This was repeatedly noted by representatives of all categories of personnel involved in the counter-terrorism operation. Therefore, we can confidently state that the Food Service of the Russian Armed Forces celebrated its 300th anniversary with new achievements. These were military achievements.

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