In the post-war history of France, the April 1961 coup occupies a special place. For four days there was a direct struggle between democracy and reaction, which largely determined the future paths of the country's political development. The putsch prepared by the reactionary military and colonialist ultra groups in Algeria was one of the most serious attempts by the reactionary forces of France to eliminate the democratic gains of the French working people, bringing the country to the brink of civil war. The scale of the plot is indicated by the fact that 198 people, mostly military, including 11 generals and 18 colonels, were tried before a military tribunal in the case of the coup .1 In Soviet historiography, the April putsch received a certain assessment and some coverage .2 However, there are still many outstanding and controversial issues, and there is no complete picture of the April coup. In this essay, an attempt is made to reconstruct the history of the "generals ' putsch" on the basis of documentary materials (verbatim reports of trials of putsch participants, publications of the archives of the "Secret Armed Organization" - SLA), memoirs, newspapers and magazines of that period, special research, to find out the reasons that gave rise to it, as well as to determine the failure.

Friday, April 21, ended as usual in Paris. Parisians, exhausted by their week of work, made plans for the weekend to the best of their abilities. The newspaper strips did not portend any extraordinary events. The central place was given by the seal to the visit of Senegalese President L. Senghor to Paris. That evening, accompanied by the President of the French Republic, General de Gaulle, he attended a performance of the tragedy Britannicus at the Comedie Francaise. Neither the general nor his companion, sitting in the presidential box, suspected that only an accident saved them from death. On that day, a mine was supposed to be laid in the president's box. But at the last moment, due to technical difficulties, the organizers of the attempt were forced to cancel the planned action 3 . De Gaulle and Senghor returned safely to their respective residences.

At 2 o'clock. 10 min. On April 22, the phone rang in de Gaulle's apartment at the Elysee Palace. Head of the Personal Office of the President Zh. de Courcelles, having learned,

1 M. Cottaz. Les proces du putsch d'Alger et du complot de Paris. P. 1962, pp. 249 - 250.

2 N. N. Molchanov. Foreign Policy of France (the Fifth Republic), Moscow, 1961. General de Gaulle, Moscow, 1972; Yu. V. Shchirovsky. The struggle of the French Communist Party against the war in Algeria, Moscow, 1962; Yu. Kharlanov. The Secret of two Crosses, Moscow, 1962; Yu. I. Rubinsky. The Fifth Republic (political struggle in France in 1958-1963). Moscow, 1964; Yu. M. Lebedev. The struggle of the French Communist Party against fascism (1958-1962). Author's abstract of the cand. Diss. M. 1964; A. A. Zlobin. The Algerian Problem in French politics (1958-1962). Author's abstract of the cand. Diss. M. 1965; B. B. Irmukhanov. The struggle of the CGT of France for unity of action of trade unions, in defense of immediate socio-economic demands and democratic freedoms (1958-1963). Author's report. cand. Diss. M. 1966; Yu. V. Borisov. The newest history of France, Moscow, 1966; N. I. Kirei. Algeria and France, 1962-1971 (Problems of Economic and Political Relations), Moscow, 1973; "History of France", vol. 3, Moscow, 1973.

3 P. Demaret, C. Plume. Objectif de Gaulle. P. 1973, 88. H. Azeau. Revolte militaire. Alger, 22 avril 1961, P. 1961, p. 103.

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What's the matter, I decided to wake up the general. The matter was indeed of the utmost importance. Prime Minister M. Debray informed the President that an uprising had begun in Algeria and the capital of this French colony had passed into the hands of rebels led by retired Army Air Force General M. Schall, former commander-in-chief of French troops in Algeria and commander of NATO forces in Central Europe. Other details are still unknown. 20 minutes after the call, de Gaulle decided to urgently send the Minister of Algerian Affairs, L. Jox, and the Chief of the General Staff, General Ollier, to Algeria. Their task is to clarify the situation and establish contacts with officials loyal to the government in Oran, Constantin and other cities of Algeria. In other words, de Gaulle's emissaries should prevent Schall from establishing control over all of Algeria. The super prefects of nine districts were ordered to alert all police forces. The Chief of Naval Staff, Admiral Cabagnier, is required to alert the French fleet at Toulon and await orders to sail for Algiers. 4
At 6 o'clock. 20 min. the first official report of the coup appeared: "The indiscipline of some commanders and their subordinate troops led to the fact that this morning in Algiers, the civil and military authorities were confronted with the inability to carry out their functions. The situation in the rest of Algeria remains stable. The Government took the necessary measures that night, which will be reported during day 5 . When the coup was launched on Saturday night, its organizers expected that most institutions and businesses would be closed over the weekend and that it would be difficult for left-wing democratic parties and trade unions to organize a rebuff to the rebels. In addition, the morning papers will not have time to inform readers about the events in Algeria. All this was intended by the putschists to create panic in the ranks of their opponents.

Who prepared the April coup? What goals were pursued by its organizers and what forces participated in it? "Our country is split in two. The Algerian events have made a tragic breach in our national community. " 6 These words of Cardinal Feltin of Paris, spoken at the beginning of the Algerian war, were even more relevant for France in the late 1950s. At that time, the country represented two sharply hostile camps - supporters and opponents of Algerian independence; the sharpness of the political struggle on the Algerian problem was largely determined by the role and significance that Algeria had for bourgeois France. Algeria had been under her rule since 1830. Over 130 years, more than 1 million Europeans have settled there, including about 750,000 people from France .7 They held key positions in all sectors of the Algerian economy, primarily in agriculture .8 All the leading positions in administrative, economic and public bodies also belonged to Europeans, or, as they called themselves, "blackfeet" (the ancestors of European settlers arrived in Algeria, according to legend, barefoot, with feet dirty from dust). The democratic traditions of the majority of metropolitan Frenchmen were completely alien to the mass of" blackfeet " infected with racism and traditionally oriented towards the most reactionary circles in France .9 In these circles, chauvinistic beliefs about the inviolability of Algeria's pre-existing status are firmly rooted. This territory was the largest French colonial market. Thus, in 1959, France's exports there accounted for 53% of all exports to the franc zone countries, while imports from Algeria accounted for more than 27% .10 Of particular importance to French monopoly capital were the Sahrawi oil, gas, and other raw materials that France was in dire need of. The loss of Algeria would also mean a resurgence-

4 "L'Express", numero special, N 515, 27.IV. 1961, pp. 6 - 7.

5 "Le Monde", 23 - 24.IV. 1961.

6 A. Grosser. La IVe. Republique et sa politique exterieure. P. 1961, p. 185.

7 "Revue de defense nationale", aout-septembre 1958, p. 1443.

8 V. V. Zagladin. Alzhirskaya problema [The Algerian Problem], Moscow, 1957. The Algerian Nation Exists, Moscow, 1958; R. M. Avakov. French Monopoly Capital in North Africa, Moscow, 1958; R. Landa. Algeria throws off its fetters. Moscow, 1961; Yu. V. Potemkin. The Algerian people in the Struggle for Independence, Moscow, 1962; I. A. Koloskov, Foreign Policy of Modern France, Moscow, 1964; N. I. Kirei. Edict op.

9 N. N. Molchanov. The Fourth Republic, Moscow, 1963, pp. 430-432.

10 "Statistique mensuelle du commerce exterieur de la France". P. 1959, p. 21.

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- the weakening of the military-strategic positions of French imperialism in the Mediterranean basin, in Africa and in the Middle East.

The French Communist Party (PCF) was at the forefront of the democratic forces demanding an end to the colonial war and the granting of independence to Algeria. From the very beginning of the war, the PCF clearly defined its position. Already on November 8, 1954, that is, a week after the beginning of the armed uprising of the Algerian people, the Politburo of the PCF in a special resolution demanded that the government of P. Mendes-France immediately stop the repression and return troops to France, recognize the validity of the claims of the Algerian people to freedom and discuss with the authorized representatives of the Algerian public the wishes of the indigenous population of Algeria 11 . The PCF consistently and persistently exposed the colonialist nature of the Algerian war, and sought to unite all democratic elements who fought against its continuation. By the end of the 1950s, the spectrum of political forces in favor of ending the war had significantly expanded at the expense of various center-left parties and groups, which at first showed hesitation and inconsistency, but then determined their negative attitude to this war12 .

As the conflict in Algeria deepened, discontent grew among a certain part of the French monopolistic bourgeoisie, which was oriented towards the development of the process of Western European economic integration and considered the war in Algeria unprofitable for the country's economy .13 The exploitation of the economic potential of Algeria and other former French colonies was conceived by her through a sophisticated neocolonialist policy. This trend began to increase with the coming to power of de Gaulle, who by that time was firmly convinced of the futility of continuing the Algerian war.

The camp of opponents of Algerian independence in the mid-50s included extreme right-wing political forces - the "national center of independents and peasants", part of the social Republicans, the" union for the protection of merchants and artisans", headed by P. Pujad, and finally obvious fascists. The core of the ultra-right in Algeria were large French landowners and planters who relied on hundreds of thousands of "blackfeet" - employees, small proprietors, artisans, merchants who were afraid of losing their capital and privileges as a result of the victory of the Algerian Revolution. The army, first of all its colonial units, was a strong support for Ultra.

The most characteristic feature of French political life throughout the 1950s and early 1960s was a significant increase in the role and influence of the army, which became one of the most powerful pressure groups in the power structure of the bourgeois republic. 14 The most important factors that determined this circumstance were the unprecedented militarization of the economy and extreme political instability in the country throughout the existence of the Fourth Republic. France is the only major capitalist power that did not stop fighting for 23 years (1939-1962). The arms race within NATO, combined with overseas adventures, led to an increase not only in military spending, but also in the size of the French armed forces: if in 1950 they numbered 242 thousand, then in 1961 already 1100 thousand. By the share of the army in the amateur population

11 "L'Humanite", 9.XI.1954.

12 For more information, see: Yu. I. Rubinsky. Decree op.

13 G. P. Chernikov. Ekonomika Frantsii [Economy of France], Moscow, 1959. Financial Oligarchy of France, Moscow, 1966; A. I. Pokrovsky. Practice versus theory. New phenomena in the French Economy and Ideological Struggle, Moscow, 1965; A. N. Goncharov. Trusts of France in "Small Europe", Moscow, 1966; V. I. Kuznetsov. France: economy of state-monopoly capitalism, Moscow, 1968; L. I. Glukharev. The impact of the "Common Market" on the economy of France. Moscow, 1971; A. S. Solonitsky. Export of capital in the neocolonialist strategy of former metropolises (on the example of France). Moscow, 1971.

14 See P. Leutin. L'Algerie des colonels. P. 1958; J. Planchais. La malaise tie l'armee. P. 1958. jusd, Urie histoire politique de l'armee de Gaulle a de Gaulle 1940 - 1967. P. 1967; J. Fauvet, J. Planchais. La Fronde des generaux. P. 1961; P. M. de la Gorce. La Republique et son armee. P. 1963; E. S. Furniss. De Gaulle and the French Army. A Crisis in Civil-military Relations. N. Y. 1964; R. Girarder. La crise militaire francaise 1945 - 1962. Aspects sociologiques et ideologiques. P. 1964.

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In the late 1950s, France ranked first among NATO member countries, and second only to the United States in terms of the share of military expenditures in national income .15 At the same time, neither the huge number of troops, nor the latest weapons, nor the generous allocation of 16 did not save the French army from defeats, which it suffered first in Indochina, and then in Algeria.

In the course of the Indochina and especially Algerian wars, the army was also given political tasks that stemmed from the nature of these wars. The army began to carry out on a large scale police-punitive, ideological, administrative, economic and other functions that go beyond its traditional competence. Its independence in making political decisions has significantly increased. The army as an institution has become aware of its increased importance in a State run by Governments mired in political and financial fraud. Her dissatisfaction with the government grew all the more because she was inclined to blame the military failures on the government's lack of attention to her needs. "It was in Indochina that the spiritual crisis of the army began. this is a terrible split between the government and the army, between the nation and the army. In Algeria, this split has deepened, " 17-Colonel R testified. Tomaso. It is no coincidence that the opposition mood has mainly affected the colonial troops of the French army. The generals of these troops (R. Salan, E. Zhuo, A. Zeller, J. Massu, P. Hardy, etc.) took an active part in numerous anti-republican plots. The abolition of the colonial system would call into question the very existence of the officer and non-commissioned officer caste in its former form. The vast majority of officers (especially the colonial infantry and paratroopers) had very little hope of continuing their careers in the mother country, given the rapid evolution of the technical means of modern warfare and the resulting reorganization of the army. This was precisely the reason for the persistence with which the officers and generals clung to the preservation of traditional military-administrative methods of exploitation of the French colonies.

The colonialist-militarist bloc, which emerged on the basis of common interests, persistently prepared the overthrow of the Fourth Republic and the establishment of a "firm government", the main task of which was to achieve victory in Algeria. The military coup of May 13, 1958 in Algeria18, which led to the liquidation of the Fourth Republic and the coming to power of the de Gaulle government, was the first act of the drama that could be called "The Struggle for French Algeria". "The army," de Gaulle wrote, " expected a lot from my return to power, especially in the highest circles of the generals... It believed that the restoration of national power would give it the time and means to win and discourage the enemy. " 19 In other words, the military hoped that de Gaulle would implement the slogans of "French Algeria". Events, however, showed that the rebel generals were deceived in their calculations. True to the principle of "seeing the world as it is", De Gaulle was able to understand the inevitability of the collapse of colonialism, and not only to understand, but also to carry out the decolonization of 13 former French possessions in 1959-1960 under the pressure of the national liberation movement. As for Algeria, de Gaulle was convinced that "there is no other way out but to recognize Algeria's right to self-determination" .20
Naturally, to reveal their plans at a time when the passions caused by the putsch on May 13 have not yet subsided, and yesterday's rebels had a strong position, de Gaulle

15 Yu. I. Rubinsky. Op. ed., p. 34; "Le Monde", 25. IV. 1961.

16 Military appropriations for the Indochina war amounted to more than 3 thousand billion francs. Allocations for the war in Algeria in just three years (1955-1957) amounted to 1,195 billion francs (R. Salan. Memoires. Fin d'un Empire. T. 3: "Algerie franchise (1 novembre 1954 - 6 juin 1958)". P. 1972, p. 412).

17 "Le proces du general Raoul Salan. Stenographic complete des audiences, requisitoire - plaidoiries - verdict". P. 1962, p. 328.

18 See on this issue: Yu. V. Borisov. Edict. op.; "History of France", Vol. 3, pp. 406-418; N. N. Molchanov. The Fourth Republic, pp. 531-558; ibid. General de Gaulle, pp. 338-368; Yu. I. Rubinsky. Op. ed., pp. 32-102; G. M. Ratiani. France: Classes and Parties in the Coups d'état of 1940 and 1958. Author's abstract. doct. Diss. M. 1970.

19 Ch. de Gaulle. Memoires d'Espoir. Le Renouveau 1958 - 1962. P. 1970, p. 48.

20 Ibid., p. 50.

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At first, I couldn't. He later admitted :" If I had said in June 1958 that I intended to grant Algeria independence, I would have been overthrown on the same day and there was nothing I could have done about it. But I always knew what I wanted. " 21 De Gaulle's first task was to stabilize the situation, for which he made several trips to Algeria, where he spoke together with General Salan and other organizers of the May coup. However, in September 1959, de Gaulle for the first time officially recognized the right of the indigenous population of Algeria to self-determination. Such a turn shocked the military-colonialist circles in France and Algeria, who considered de Gaulle their hostage and debtor. It is since 1959 that a new conspiracy has been brewing in the army, this time directed against the policies of the government and de Gaulle personally. In January 1959, among the officers in Paris, an underground group of 50 people appeared, called the "Army-Nation". It has established close ties with the highly reactionary Cite Catholic group. Enlisting the support of accomplices in Lyon and Algeria, the Army-Nation began fighting the Government in January 1960. Letters and leaflets written by an underground group began to circulate in army circles. One of these letters sharply criticized the Algerian government's policy and stressed that "against this illegal, unconstitutional policy, the uprising is not only legitimate, but it is a sacred duty" 22 .

Discontent with de Gaulle's Algerian policy swept through the highest circles of the generals. On March 5, 1960, the day de Gaulle first uttered the words "Republic of Algeria", General Schall, the future leader of the April coup, wrote in his diary: "From now on, I am seriously considering the meaning of my time in the army." 23 Another leader of the putschists, Army General Zeller, former Chief of the Army Staff If you ask me to summarize the deep reasons for my actions (in April 1961 - P. C.), I will answer that they stemmed solely from the desire to preserve Algeria under French sovereignty. " 24 As the Algerian policy of the de Gaulle government evolved towards granting Algeria independence, the generals ' fronde became increasingly outspoken. On November 11, 1960, Marshal A. Juin refused to participate in the solemn ceremony on the occasion of the anniversary of the Armistice of 1918, and in an open letter to the President of the republic, he sharply condemned his Algerian policy and the idea of a referendum on Algerian self-determination, which de Gaulle decided to hold.

On January 4, 1961, the press published an appeal by 16 reserve generals to the French to say "No!" in the referendum. Among them were the future participants of the April coup. A sensation was the demonstrative resignation in January 1961 from the post of Commander of NATO forces in Central Europe, Army General Schall of the Air Force. At a meeting with Prime Minister Debray, he said: "The government's policy is leading Algeria, and then France, to disaster." At the same time, he expressed his criticism of the Fifth Republic's Atlantic and European policies to the Prime Minister: "Let France give up the atomic bomb and accept Atlantic integration; in return, the United States will help it preserve Algeria."25
After leaving the army, Schall settled in Lyon, where he received numerous emissaries of ex-Colonel A. Argu. Argu had by then become the conspiracy's think tank. A graduate of the Polytechnic School, a participant in the Second World War, he served for a long time in Algeria under the command of General "para" (as the paratroopers are called in France) Massu, one of the main participants in the putsch of May 13, 1958. After the" week of barricades " in the Algerian capital (January 24 - February 1, 1960), when 22 people were killed and about 200 wounded in armed clashes between the ultra and the police, Argu, who sided with the ultra, was killed by the police.,

21 M. Ferro. De Gaulle el l'Amerique. Une amitie tumultueuse. P. 1973, p. 358.

22 J. Fauvet, J. Planсhais. Op. cit., p. 75.

23 P. Demaret, C. Plume. Op. cit., p. 31.

24 "Le proces des generaux Challe et Zeller. Textes complets des debats, requisitoires, plaidoiries, annexes". P. 1961, pp. 49 - 50.

25 P. Demaret, C. Plume. Op. cit., p. 86; J. Fauvet, J. Planсhais. Op. cit., p. 46.

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he was court-martialed, but acquitted. In the spring of 1961, he devoted himself entirely to preparing a new coup in Algeria. To lead the coup, he intended to involve Schall, to whom he wrote: "France still has all the trump cards in its hands... Come with us. Many military personnel are ready. We will show that Algeria can be pacified, not abandoned. " 26 (many military personnel included Generals Jouhault, Zeller, and Salan). Schall hesitated.

For the native of Oran, E. Jouot, the slogan "French Algeria" had a special meaning. All his interests and career were connected with Algeria, where he spent his childhood, where he served and fought. Disagreeing with de Gaulle's Algerian policy, Army Air Force General Joue retired in October 1960 and settled in Algiers, becoming the director of a cardboard factory. At the same time, he was honorary president of the chauvinist organization National Association of French North Africans. Zhuo became active in preparing for a new coup. One of his accomplices was Zeller. Before retiring, the latter obtained permission to visit Algeria under the pretext of saying goodbye to the troops. There, he defiantly laid a wreath at the monument with the inscription " Army General Zeller - to those who fell for French Algeria." In January 1961, he signed the "manifesto of the generals", which called for saying" No! " in a referendum on Algeria's self-determination.

The fourth main actor in the conspiracy of generals was Salan, who served as commander-in-chief of French troops in Indochina and Algeria. After retiring in June 1960, Salan was allowed to settle in Algeria, but was expelled a month later for anti-government activities. Once in Paris under the supervision of the police, Salan makes an escape plan, which he managed to carry out. He crossed the Spanish border and settled in Madrid, where he was patronized by a relative of the dictator Franco S. Sunier. There he established contacts with the organizers of the" week of barricades " P. Lagaillard, J. -J. Susini, B. Lefebvre, and Argu. On March 24, Schall received in his apartment in Lyon the former head of his military cabinet, Colonel J. de Boissier (a distant relative of de Gaulle), who was privy to the plot. The colonel urged his former boss to agree to lead the coup. According to him, the army in Algeria will follow him without question. Schall still hesitated. Two days later, he was visited by Jouot, who arrived from Algeria, and then Zeller, who also urged Schall to make a decision.

While the future leaders of the coup discussed the situation in Algeria, its direct organizers and performers were busy preparing a practical speech. On April 8, 1961, in one of the offices of the Ecole Militaire in Paris, a group of military officers gathered - Generals Vanyuksem and J. Faure, Colonels J. Vanyuksem. Bruase, Argu and I. Godard, Captain P. Serjeant, Lieutenant R. Degeldre. It decided to launch a putsch simultaneously in the metropolitan 27 .

On April 11, at a press conference, de Gaulle said that France would not prevent the formation of an independent Algerian state, "sovereign inside and out." For Schall, the matter was settled. The next day, he met with Generals Zhuo, Zeller, Faure and P. Hardy. "Zeller, Zhuo and I," Schall later said before the military tribunal, " have set the date of the speech for April 20. Zhuo flew to Algeria to meet us. " 28 Vanyuksem, the deputy commander of the French forces in West Germany, who was to send two motorized brigades to Paris, was the first to be informed of the decision. The conspirators informed J. of their plans. Bidot, a former minister in a number of governments of the Fourth Republic, who claimed an important post if the coup was successful.

On April 16, Jouhot met with General P.-M. Bigot, commander of the 5th District of the Air Force in Algeria ("blackfoot", former Vichy), and on April 20 he ordered the head of the 3rd bureau of his staff, Major Schutz, to leave for Paris to join the Air Force headquarters, where the conspirators had an accomplice, General J.-L. Nicot, temporarily performing at that time

26 "Le proces des generaux Challe et Zeller", p. 39.

27 P. Demaret, C. Plume. Op. cit.. p. 87.

28 "Le proces des generaux Challe et Zeller", p. 40.

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period of duty of the Chief of Staff of the French Air Force 29 . Niko gives orders to the chief of the Crela Air force base to prepare a twin-engine plane for flight. On the same day, in the office of Colonel S. Lacheroy at the Ecole Militaire, Godard and Argu were finishing the final version of the Schall declaration, which he was to read out on the day of the coup. Since April 16, the head of the cabinet was illegally in Algeria, where he was preparing a coup on the spot. At 18 o'clock. 45 min. On April 20, a twin-engine Nor-2501 took off from the runway of the Crela Air Base and headed for Algeria. On board were Schall, Zeller and Colonel J. Broise, dressed in civilian clothes. A few hours later, the plane landed at Blida airfield, where Colonel Zh. Robin is accompanied by a group of Foreign Legion paratroopers. The new arrivals settled in Villa Tagarin near the Algerian capital. On the same day, other leaders of the coup appeared in Algeria - General P. Hardy, a former inspector of the Foreign Legion, Argu and Godard .30 The capture of Algiers was assigned to a detachment of paratroopers of Robin and the 1st Parachute Regiment of the Foreign Legion, which was part of the 10th Parachute Division stationed in the Zeralda region. The 1st Para Regiment actively participated in many colonial wars and expeditions, including in Indochina and Algeria, in the Suez adventure. At the time of the coup, the regimental commander, Colonel Guiro, was on leave, and the regiment was temporarily commanded by Major E. Denois de Saint-Marc, a veteran of the colonial forces, a staunch supporter of"French Algeria". The leaders of the coup placed all their hopes on him.

As you know, a conspiracy involving hundreds of people is always at risk of being discovered. One can definitely say that for de Gaulle and his government, the coup was not a surprise. The very situation that existed in Algeria and the metropolis after May 13, 1958, did not give grounds for calm. Lightning bolts of discontent with the Algerian policy of the de Gaulle government could constantly cause a new crisis. However, there were also more specific signs of impending events. On April 19, two proclamations appeared in Algiers. The first one was written by R. Martel, one of the leaders of the Algerian ultras. It called for an uprising - " Organize, unite, arm yourselves!" Martel called on French Algerians to join terrorist organizations: "These organizations, working in close cooperation with Madrid and our chief General Salan, coordinate the liberation of the motherland. The opposition is organizing, uniting, and becoming more and more powerful." About Salan, the proclamation said: "He alone is our true leader!"31 . The second leaflet belonged to SLA 32 . Calling on soldiers, officers and police to defy the Gaullist authorities, the leaflet ended with the words: "Be prepared to join the national army in the hour of insurrection."33
Debray received information on 19 April that there were "indications of an operation that has not yet been determined and that some elements in the army might have initiated it" .34 On the evening of April 21, more specific information about the coup plans appeared. On that day, a certain Lieutenant Savary from the Tizi Ouzou garrison, who was privy to the plot and refused to participate in it, revealed it to his boss, General Simon, commander of the Eastern zone of Algiers. The military security service also had other evidence of an impending coup. Everything was reported to Paris and to the General Delegate in Algeria, J. Morin. At 20 hours and 30 minutes. He summoned the Prefect of Police and the director of the Surtay Generale (security service) and discussed a possible course of action. It was decided to monitor the main approaches to the city and strengthen the protection of public buildings 35 . That's all! Similar carelessness-

29 M. Cottaz. Op. cit., р. 20; .J. Fauvet, .J. Planchais. Op. cit., p. 88.

30 P. Beyssade. La guerre d'Algerie 1954 - 1962. P. 1968, p. 213; J. Fauvet, J. Planchais. Op. cit., pp. 36 - 90.

31 J. Fauvet, J. Planсhais. Op. cit., pp. 79 - 80.

32 For information on the activities of the SLA, see: B. Fenyo. OAS M. 1962; P. P. Cherkasov. The collapse of the SLA. Voprosy Istorii, 1974, No. 9.

33 J. Fauvet, J. Planchais. Op. cit., pp. 80 - 81.

34 "Journal officiel de la Republique Francaise. Debats parlementaires. Assemblee Nationals Seance du mardi 25 avril 1961", N 9, 26.IV.1961, p. 510.

35 "Le proces des generaux Challe et Zeller", p. 88; J. Fauvet, J. Planсhais. Op. cit., pp. 103 - 104.

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It cannot be explained otherwise than by underestimating the situation that has developed, or even by a secret desire to aggravate it. If the public of the country had been informed about the plans of the coup in a timely and widespread manner and effective measures had been taken to stop them, then, apparently, the initiators of the coup would not have dared to start their action. But nothing of the sort happened, and a few hours later the fate of France was once again, for the umpteenth time in a short time, thrown into the balance of history.

At 2330 hours, Morin was talking to the Minister of Transport and Public Works, R. Buron, who had arrived in Algeria for the grand opening of the School of Public Works, when the phone rang in his office. The Prefect of Police informed the General Delegate that a group of soldiers led by the captain had deserted from the Tizi Ouzu garrison. 15 minutes later, new information was received about the concentration and movement of troops in 20 km from the city of Algiers. The putschists, posing as government troops, occupied, according to Morin's orders, public buildings. This allowed them to by 2 o'clock. at night, approach the General Delegate's residence, Summer Palace 36, without firing a shot . Commander-in-Chief of the French forces in Algeria, General F. Gambiese, after unsuccessful attempts to contact the command of the 1st Parachute Regiment, together with Brigadier General Saint-Illyer, commander of the 10th division, which included this regiment, went to meet the putschists. Soon, they came across a convoy of trucks. The generals blocked their path. Then a para lieutenant jumped out of the nearest truck and reported: "Don't you know that? Schall and Zeller have arrived!"

"Have you seen them?" Gambiez asks.

"Not me, but others.

"I'm putting you under arrest," the commander-in-chief sums up the dialogue.

The lieutenant returned to the truck, ordered the driver to move, and the general's Jeep was pulled to the side of the road. Gambiez rushed after column 37 . He caught up with her at the gates of the Summer Palace. Gambiez turned to the gendarmes guarding Morin's residence: "These are rebels. Do your duty! " But the gendarmes didn't move. Only a few of them took up automatic weapons. The same lieutenant warned the general: "You are provoking bloodshed." The "couple" jumped out of their cars and held their submachine guns at the ready. Gambiez blocked the entrance to the palace, but the paratroopers threw him aside, broke into the building and began to demand the extradition of the general delegate. At this time, Morin, locked in one of the offices, called the special communications phone in Paris, and then in Oran and Constantin to the commanders of the army corps, Generals A. de Pouilly and M.-M. Gouraud, and informed them of what was happening. Soon, however, communication was cut off, and the putschists who broke into the office captured the general delegate 38 . Another group of putschists at this time rushed to the quarter of Pelissier, where the headquarters of General Vezinet, the commander of the metropolitan army corps, was located. After overcoming the weak resistance of the guards, the paratroopers, led by Captain Borel, broke into Vezinet's office and disarmed him. With the butt of his carbine, the legionnaire smashed a portrait of de Gaulle hanging on the wall. And the commander of the army corps was forced by the putschists to leave his residence under escort.

After capturing the Summer Palace and the headquarters of the Algerian Corps, the rebels went to the "Fort of the Emperor", where the operational headquarters were located, and occupied it also without firing a shot. The last of the highest military leaders of the Gaullist administration in Algeria was Vice Admiral Kervil, commander-in-chief of the French Navy in the Mediterranean. His Gaullist beliefs were well known to the coup leaders. A reinforced squad of paratroopers was sent to the Admiral's villa in El Biar. Kervil found out about the coup at 3 o'clock in the morning. At about the same time, General Ollier called him from Paris and said he was counting on him. As soon as the admiral hung up the phone, the putschists broke into the house. While Madame Kervil was negotiating with them, the Admiral had already disappeared into the garden. After searching the house and not finding the admiral, the "couple" left. Then Kervil, disguised in civilian clothes, went to the Admiralty, which had not yet been captured by the putschists. From there, he issued the appropriate orders, announcing that, as senior, he was taking temporary command of all of them.

36 "Le proces des generaux Challe et Zeller", p. 89.

37 J. Fauvet, J. Planсhais. Op. cit., pp. 106 - 107.

38 "Le proces des generaux Challe et Zeller", p. 90.

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French troops in Algeria. Meanwhile, Godard was blocking the Admiralty with tanks, and the commander-in-chief of the naval forces had to take a patrol boat to escape to Oran. That leaves the police. Godard carries out a lightning operation to capture the building of the central commissariat and arrest Commissioner Fasho. A group of OAS members took part in the operation, which took out several hundred submachine guns and carbines from the warehouses of the commissariat. 39 In the early hours of the morning, OAS forces seized the prison and released 70 terrorist prisoners from various ultra-chauvinist organizations .40
At first, success seemed to accompany the putschists. By 4 o'clock in the morning, the capital of Algeria was completely under their control. Schall explained the reason for the success:"If we captured the city of Algiers almost without firing a shot in an hour and a half, it was because doors were being opened everywhere." 41 The putschists constantly felt the moral support of the bulk of the "blackfeet" and individual military units. However, from the very first steps, the rebel generals completely ignored their objective allies from among the civilian ultra, who were eager to actively participate in the putsch, but were rebuffed. "Officers have a kind of allergy to the nascent SLA movement, which focuses on General Salan," 42 the French researchers noted. Schall constantly emphasized the purely military nature of the putsch.

At 8 o'clock. 45 min, on April 22, the putschist radio station broadcast a statement from Schall, who announced that he had arrived to save Algeria and "reserves the right to extend his actions to the mother country." 43 This phrase revealed the true goals of the coup, which went far beyond the task of "saving Algeria". It was about an attempted coup d'etat, which immediately predetermined the extreme hostility of public opinion to the actions of the putschists. Subsequently, Schall will avoid making political statements, and in court will begin to defend the version about the" apolitical nature " of the putsch he unleashed. But this will not convince anyone, especially since all the activities of the putschists clearly revealed their far-reaching political plans. Their goal was not only to keep Algeria under French sovereignty, but also to overthrow the de Gaulle government. The rebel generals did not think at all about returning to the parliamentary regime of the Fourth Republic, to which the organizers of the putsch felt organic disgust and the fall of which they contributed in no small measure in 1958.

Militant anti-communism was fundamental to the worldview of the leaders of the April coup, along with their colonialist beliefs. For them, both in France and Algeria, there was one main opponent - communism. Having unleashed the putsch, the generals strongly emphasized its anti-communist orientation. American columnist J. R. R. Tolkien Olson wrote in those days: "There is no doubt that General Schall and his associates were hoping for American help by playing the anti-communist card." 44 In a conversation with General de Pouilly, whom Schall tried to win over to his side, he said that "when I worked in NATO, I knew that all the allies were alarmed by the communist invasion of North Africa, and I thought that this would not be allowed to happen."45
On April 22, the putschists created a military tribunal to try those responsible for the "surrender of Algeria and the Sahara", in other words, those who opposed the continuation of the colonial war and advocated granting the indigenous population of Algeria the right to self-determination. Having settled in the capital, the triumvirate of generals tried to establish contacts with the commanders of units and units stationed in the provincial cities of Algeria, primarily in Constantine and Oran. Argu came to the commander of the Constantine army corps Gouraud, who got him to agree to send the 1st cavalry Regiment of the Foreign Legion to Algiers.

39 J. Fauvet, J. Planchais. Op. cit., pp. 114 - 1 16.

40 "Organisation armee secrete". (Documents choisis et chronologie etablie par M. -Th. Lancelot). T. 1. P. 1963, p. 13.

41 "Le proces des generaux Challe et Zeller", p. 55.

42 P. Demaree, C. Plume, Op. cit., p. 89

43 H. Azeau. Op. cit., pp. 265 - 267.

44 "The New York Herald Tribune", 26.JV.1961.

45 "Le proces des generaux Challe el Zeller", p. 121.

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under the command of Colonel Sh. de la Chapelle. Guro himself could not decide to take a certain position 46 . The commander of the Orange corps behaved differently. The Marquis A. de Pouilly was known in the army as a legitimist, supported de Gaulle and remained loyal to him. As a fellow graduate of the Saint-Cyr Military School, de Pouilly was not, however, so sensitive to the prestige of the rebel general. After receiving news of the events in the capital, de Yuyi immediately took a negative stance against the rebels. Lacking sufficient forces to launch an offensive against Algeria, he adopted a defensive tactic, putting all available forces on alert.

The" black-footed " population of Oran, having learned about the putsch in Algeria, openly showed their sympathy for the putschists. National flags appeared everywhere, the SLA emerged from the underground, and volunteers were recruited on the streets to help the putschists. But among the senior officers, there was unanimity and support for the actions of their commander. Emissary Schall's attempt to excite the legionnaires failed 47 . On the morning of April 22, de Gaulle's envoys, Ollier and Jocx, arrived at Oran. Kervil soon joined them.

The results of the first day were uncertain for Schall. On the one hand, he became the master of the situation in the Algerian capital. It was supported by the 10th and 25th Parachute Divisions, then the 13th Demi-brigade, the 1st Sahrawi Squadron, the 2nd and 5th Infantry regiments of the Foreign Legion, and separate units of the 213rd Marine Regiment 48 . However, the Air Force units did not follow the example of their commander Bi-go, who joined the ranks of the rebels. The Navy was also hostile to the coup. Gouraud, who had declared his support for the coup, hesitated. The corps at Oran was not to be counted on. In the Algerian capital itself, the situation continued to be difficult. Although the city was in the hands of the putschists, the barracks of the units that refused to join them were not blocked. No action was taken to create a defense of the city in case of an offensive by government troops. "Our enterprise had to be successful within 48 hours," Schall later said, "otherwise it would have been doomed." 49 The immediate task for Schall and his accomplices at that time was to force Oran and Constantina to join Algeria. Schall, Jouhot, and Zeller had high hopes for Paris, where events were expected that, in their opinion, could radically change the situation in favor of the rebels.

On the morning of April 22, the Paris prefecture carried out an operation, the true meaning of which became clear after some time. A police task force arrived at the Avenue Kleber with a warrant for the arrest of French Army Captain F. de Saint-Remy came from the Ministry of War Veterans ' Affairs and, not finding him at home, rushed to Avenue Niel, where Major F. de Saint-Remy's friend lived. Bleau, son of the Vichy Secretary of State for Maritime Affairs. There, the police found not only the captain, but also several other military personnel. Among them was the divisional General Zh. Vor, whose dossier was opened by the security service back in the early 50s. When he was head of the military school at Saint-Maixant in 1954, Faure openly turned cadets against the government. In 1956, while in Algeria, he spoke out in defense of Pujade, the leader of the far-right reaction. Faure was closely associated with the organizers of the putsch of May 13, 1958, and spoke out in support of the ultra. Transferred to Paris without a new assignment, he began plotting another plot and in early April was appointed by Schall to lead the coup in the mother country. The police found out about this from the papers seized during the search. At the same time as Faure, Saint-Remy and Bleau, Colonel R. Vaudray, Majors P. Mouchonnet, F. Azay and R. Casatti were arrested, and Prefect J. de la Reine was arrested. Leger, Director of the credit company M. Le Comte, Doctor A.-P. Katala and other persons, and a little later-B. Sabure, in whose car was found an encrypted list of participants in the conspiracy and a plan to capture Paris. More than 130 people were involved in the" Paris conspiracy " .50 To the conspiracy

46 P. Beyssade. Op. cit., p. 214.

47 J. Fauvel, J. Planchais. Op. cit., p. 134.

48 "Le Monde", 24.IV.1961.

49 "Le proces des generaux Challe et Zeller", p. 61.

50 22 persons were brought to trial (see: Le Monde, 24. IV. 1961; P. Beyssade. Op. cit., p. 215; J. Fauvet, J. Planchais. Op. cit., pp. 151 - 155.

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Godard and Serjeant, who participated in a secret meeting at the Ecole Militaire on April 8, 1961, were implicated.

From the documents found and the statements of the arrested, it became known that a secret organization headed by Faure was operating in Paris. It consisted of three departments. The first was engaged in recruiting accomplices from representatives of extreme right-wing circles and former military personnel, and was also supposed to ensure that parts of the Paris garrison obeyed the orders of Faure. The second division obtained information about the positions of certain military commanders in order to use or neutralize them. The task of the third department was psychological and ideological processing of the population. Shortly before the coup, the third department printed 2,000 leaflets calling on the army to come out in support of the rebels .51 The conspirators had accomplices in the French forces in Germany in the person of Deputy Commander General Vanijsem and commander of the 5th Panzer Brigade General Gribius. The 501st Tank Regiment, stationed in Rambouillet, and the 2nd Orleans Hussars (motorized mechanized) Regiment were to take part in the operation to capture Paris. The capture of Paris was planned to be carried out from three directions by concentric strikes. The first column, following the road from Auxerre through the Bois de Vincennes, the Place de la Nation, and the Bridge of Austerlitz, was to capture the prefecture. The second column (501st Tank Regiment), moving through the Bois de Boulogne and Place de la Zvezda, was intended to block the Champs-Elysees. The third, operating from the Boulevard Montparnasse, was to seize the Bourbon Palace-the seat of the National Assembly and the Matignon Hotel - the residence of the head of government. Godard was going to specify the meeting places of the putschists and their further actions after the seizure of government institutions on April 22, 52 .

The organizers of the "Paris conspiracy" were very concerned about the PCF, because they were well aware of its power and influence on the working people. At the trial, one of the conspirators, Sabure, said that the leadership had instructed him to organize a possible "rebuff to the communist movement" after the coup, in other words, to paralyze the ultra - PCF with the help of paramilitary detachments-the only powerful and organized force capable of thwarting the plans of the putschists .53
At noon on April 22, Prime Minister Debray called together the military and police leaders responsible for maintaining order in the country and entrusted them with the fight against the coup. In this headquarters, until the very defeat of the coup, an accomplice of the putschists, Aviation General Nick O, sat and enjoyed the confidence of the Prime minister, replacing his boss, General Stelen, who was on a business trip to Madagascar, as Chief of the Air Force staff. In this situation, the President of the Republic kept his cool. At a meeting of the Council of Ministers convened at 17 o'clock, de Gaulle said:: "In this case, gentlemen, what is important above all is that it is not serious."54 de Gaulle knew the men who led the coup well and had a low opinion of their courage and ability to act. In response to the warning that Schall, at the head of the paratroopers, was about to arrive in Paris, he replied:: "If it were Fidel Castro, but not Schall." 55 De Gaulle invited the American ambassador to the Elysee Palace and asked about possible assistance from the American VI Fleet in the Mediterranean against the rebels. De Gaulle soon received a telegram from J. R. R. Tolkien. Kennedy declaration of support and solidarity 56 .

The news of the putsch of the generals in Algeria stirred up the whole country. General Secretary of the Central Committee of the PCF M. Thorez appealed to the leadership of the French Socialist Party( SFIO), the United Socialist Party (SWP), the Radical Party, the Catholic Republican People's Movement (MCP), the democratic trade unions, the peace movement and other organizations to unite in the fight against the general putsch. The Politburo of the PCF issued a statement that read: "The Communist Party calls on the working class and

51 M. Cottaz. Op. cit., pp. 211 - 212;J. Fauvet, J. Planchais. Op. cit., p. 155.

52 J. Fauvet, J. Planсhais. Op. cit., p. 154.

53 M. Cot t a z. Op. cit., p. 232.

54 J. Fauvet, J. Planchais. Op. cit., p. 157.

55 N. N. Molchanov. General de Gaulle, p. 395.

56 H. Azeau. Op. cit., p. 157.

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all democratic forces call for an immediate rebuff and joint action in all forms against the masterminds and authors of the coup in Algeria." The PCF has long warned of the threat from far-right forces; in early April, it stated that while a handful of "activists" enjoy the leniency of the authorities and expand their terrorist activities, "the government is taking measures against the supporters of peace." Demanding decisive action against the putschists, the PCF informed the workers on April 22 that they "must rely primarily on their own efforts." 57
On April 22, the "Coordination Committee of the Left Democratic Forces" was established, consisting of representatives of the FKP, SFIO, OSP, radicals, left Gaullist and democratic trade unions, which met for the first meeting at 15: 30. Major trade unions and parties strongly criticized the actions of the putschists. CGT stated: "Only the broadest alliance of workers and democrats is capable of inflicting a decisive defeat on the military rebels and ultras. This defeat will clear the way for negotiations and peace in Algeria, for freedom and democracy." The FKHT (Confederation of Christian Workers) demanded that the government "act in the strongest possible way." Force Courier stated: "The protection of republican institutions is an obvious and imperative duty of the population." The Union for the Defense of the New Republic (UNR) called on the population to" give their full support to General de Gaulle and the Government in defending State authority and republican legitimacy. "58 The Federation of the clerical party of the MCI of the Seine Department responded in this way: "MCI activists... assure the President of the Republic of their continued commitment to democratic institutions and express their full support for the Government's actions against subversive elements." The SFIO Bureau stated: "In the face of a new and serious threat posed by the military coup, all Democratic Republicans must stand together and be vigilant." 59 The SWP "believes that the popular response to the coup must be united, powerful and immediate." 60
Even the first reaction of public opinion in France to the news of the coup showed the moral isolation of the rebels. At the same time, their hopes of confusion and panic in the democratic camp were buried. The right-wing bourgeois parties also refused to support them. After the discovery and prevention of the "Paris plot", the putschists no longer had to hope for help from the mother country. It remained to force the events in Algeria.

The central event of the next day of the coup, on April 23, was the arrival in the Algerian capital of General Salan from Madrid, where, according to him, he " waited for the moment when it would be possible to return to Algeria and resume the fight against the FIO (National Liberation Front)"61 . Salan's plane landed at the Mason Blanche airfield. Together with him arrived Zh.- Zh. Suzini, a former leader of Algerian students, an active participant in the "barricade week", who became a political adviser to the general, and Captain Zh. Ferrandi, Salan's aide-de-camp. Among the four main actors in the April coup, Salan had the greatest political ambitions. In the April plot, he directly represented the interests of the "blackfeet". All his activities during the coup and later, when he became the head of the SLA, confirm this.

The Blackfeet linked Salan's arrival in Algeria with hopes that they would be more widely involved in leading the coup, despite Schall's opposition. The triumvirate of generals received their accomplice with outward courtesy, but without enthusiasm. As for Schall, he never had much sympathy for his predecessor as commander-in-chief in Algeria. Upon arrival, Salan went to the General Delegation and took Morin's office. On the same day, he formed his own civilian cabiet consisting of Suzini, Ferrandi, Achard and Marie, around which soon gathered a significant number of "civilians" who created command posts in various quarters of Algiers. From the office of the General Delegate of the Ca-

57 "L'Humanite", 4, 23.IV. 1961; "Cahiers du conmiunisme", 1961, N 5, p. 1065.

58 "Le Monde", 23 - 24.IV.1961.

59 "Le Figaro", 24.IV.1961.

60 "Le Monde", 23 - 24.IV.1961.

61 "Le proces du general Raoul Salan", p. 80.

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lan started sending out his own directives. After the coup is defeated, there will be a General Delegation in the archive.A document signed by Salan was discovered appointing a certain Carabin to the position of prefect in Tizi-Uzu 62 . On the same day, a quartet of generals distributed their responsibilities: Schall, who was given the rank of "commander - in - chief", took command of the putschist armed forces; Joue, the organization of supplies and transportation, as well as responsibility for propaganda; Zeller, economic and financial affairs; Salan, civil administration and communication with the population .63 At operational meetings at the rebel headquarters, the latter constantly demanded the involvement of civilian ultra-citizens in the coup. "I insisted on the mobilization of two battalions of territorial troops and the conscription of eight age groups," he admitted in court.

On April 23, three more rebel regiments arrived in the Algerian capital. Leaving one regiment at his disposal, Schall sent two others (the 14th and 18th) to Oran to put pressure on de Pouilly. The latter was evacuated at this time and moved with its headquarters to Tlemcen. Units of the 10th Paratroop Division landed in Constantin. Meanwhile, de Gaulle's emissaries, Minister Jox and General Ollier, arrived. On the eve of their arrival, Guro, once again changing his position, ordered to prepare an order for the troops of the corps to be loyal to the government, but at the last moment refrained from distributing it. The stay of the Degollev envoys in Constantine was not prolonged. Schall ordered their arrest. But the commander of the 8th Air Force District, General M. Fourke, refused to comply with the order and provided them with a plane to return to Paris. On April 23, Zeller arrived in Constantina at the head of a squad of paratroopers. He strode into Gouraud's office. "I didn't have long discussions with General Gouraud," Zeller testified at the trial. "I gave him 15 minutes to think, and after that Guro signed his name." A document prepared in advance read: "General Gouraud, commander of the army corps at Constantin, joins General Schall with all parts of his corps." 65
And in Paris, the Sunday afternoon of April 23 began with explosions of plastic bombs. At 3 o'clock in the morning, an explosion thunders at Orly airport, killing one person. At 7 o'clock - a new explosion at the Lyon station, then at the Austerlitz station, as a result - 17 injured 66 . The radio reports sad news from Algeria: Schall controls most of the Algerian territory. Back in Paris, Jox and Ollier reported on the severity of the situation. There were continuous meetings at the Elysee Palace and the Matignon Hotel. Possible measures for the defense of the metropolis and the capital were discussed. The main problem for the top political and military leadership of the country was the question of the use of fire. After much discussion, the Prime Minister ordered the troops to launch military operations on land and in the air in the event of a coup advance. Emergency measures were taken to strengthen the security of the Elysee Palace. 70 Marines arrived from Toulon to protect the president.

Nico, an accomplice of the putschists, tried to dissuade Debra from sending Air Force units to Algeria under various pretexts. Having been instructed by the Prime Minister at 21 o'clock to prepare a written order for the Air Force units to open fire on the rebels if they advanced into the metropolis, Nico sabotaged its implementation until 23 hours. 30 minutes, when he finally brought it to Debre for viewing. However, even after that, the general stalled for time and, in violation of the directive, sent the order to the authorities only at 4 o'clock. 24 min. April 24th 67 . It was announced that the President will address the nation on radio and television at 20 o'clock. In Algeria, thousands of radio and transistor radios were turned on everywhere, and hundreds of thousands of people were gathered around them. At the specified time, de Gaulle appeared on TV screens, dressed in a military uniform. Strongly condemning the coup, he stated:: "In the name of France, I order you to use all means, I emphasize all means, to block the way of these people...

62 Ibid., p. 87.

63 "Le proces des generaux Challe et Zeller", p. 13.

64 "Le proces du general Raoul Salan", p. 81.

65 "Le proces des generaux Challe et Zeller", p. 57.

66 "Le Monde", 23 - 24.IV.1961.

67 J. Fauvet, J. Planсhais. Op. cit., pp. 187 - 189, 200 - 201.

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I forbid any Frenchman, and above all any soldier, to follow their orders... French women, French people, help me!"68 . Delivered in a calm manner, de Gaulle's speech made a great impression on some of the rebels, although they were inspired with the idea of justice and the inevitable victory of their action. The speech particularly affected the soldiers of the contingent (this is what conscripts serving military service are called in France, as opposed to regular military personnel). Already in the morning of the next day, a delegation of soldiers came to the commander of the Algerian army corps appointed by the rebels, General A. Petit, and declared their disapproval of the putsch and their disagreement to participate in it. Ferment was also observed in the barracks of the 9th Zouave Regiment, which refused to obey the orders of Schall 69 .

A great deal of work was done in the rebel units by the Communists, who explained to the ordinary participants of the putsch the true goals of its organizers. At the trial, Schall admitted: "On Sunday evening, when the situation changed markedly in our favor, I was warned that communist cells were working among the soldiers at the Air Force bases, and then in other parts... The speech of the head of state further reinforced the doubts of the waverers. " 70 In the evening, rumors spread across the French capital about the upcoming night landing of putschists to capture Paris. These rumors reached a climax after the broadcast at 23 o'clock. 45 min. on the radio and television of the Prime Minister's speech, Later in court, Schall and Zeller categorically denied the intention to send paratroopers to capture Paris. Their motives are clear: they didn't want to burden their guilt with an additional burden.

By the beginning of the coup, Schall had 50 Nor-2500 aircraft at his disposal, capable of transporting 35 people with full equipment. Of these, 45 aircraft were airworthy . In addition, the putschists could count on the aircraft of the civil airlines "Air France" and "Air Algerie", and in total - on 35 passenger planes. In general, these 80 aircraft could transport no more than 3 thousand people. "Two thousand paratroopers might have succeeded in landing on Paris in 1958," witness Colonel P. Gubar, deputy commander of the southern zone of Algiers, said at the Schall - Zeller trial, "but in 1961 it smacks of a detective novel." 72 The capture of Paris by such a small force was extremely difficult. The General Staff and the military cabinet of the president, after discussing the possibility of landing troops in the metropolis, came to the conclusion that at least 20 thousand people would have to participate in it, which Schall had nothing to transport. "Therefore," the experts stated, " it is unlikely that the attack on Paris would have been carried out only by landing. To ensure success, the support of troops in the mother country is necessary. " 73 After the disclosure of the "Paris conspiracy", it was difficult to expect such support.

The air assets available to the putschists were unreliable due to the open opposition of most parts of the Air Force to the mutiny. On April 24, Bigot reported to Schall that he had no more crews or planes, and his headquarters was empty. Officers and soldiers-aviators refused to follow the orders of their commander. In the region of Regaya, the pilots of the 23rd helicopter regiment, led by the commander, publicly expressed their loyalty to the republic. After the rally, 35 heavy helicopters took off in the direction of Batna, where the headquarters of General Furke, who was soon appointed commander of the 5th Air Force District instead of Bigot, was located. De Pouilly, who met with Schall on April 24, asked him about landing in the metropolis. "Landing in the metropolis? Schall said. - This was never on the agenda, and I never had such intentions. My goal is to hold out for three months. I will change the situation (in Algeria) and create a psychological shock in the metropolis." De Pouilly expressed doubts that Schall would last three months. "The strangulation will start very quickly," he told a former classmate. To this Schall replied: "Don't forget that I held a post in NATO. All the allies are afraid of Communist infiltration in the Northern Af-

68 "Le Figaro", 25.IV.1961.

69 J. Fauvet, J. Planсhais. Op. cit., p. 185.

70 "Le proces des generaux Challe el Zeller", pp. 41 - 42.

71 Ibid., p. 110.

72 "Le Monde", 25.IV.1961; "Le proces des generaux Challe et Zeller", p. 110.

73 "L'Express", numero special, N 515, 27.IV.1961, p. 7.

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to Rick, and they won't leave me. In any case, there's a wall behind me now. " 74 In this dialogue, there are words that reveal the plans of the leaders of the coup. After the failure of General Faure's plot in Paris, which was supposed to operate simultaneously with the putschists in Algeria, Schall's tactic was to gain a foothold in Algeria, create a state of psychological shock in the metropolis and force the government to resign. In other words, the putsch of May 13, 1958 was about to be repeated. But, as is often the case in history, the attempt of certain figures to force her to make a second round, as a rule, turns out to be a farce. So it turned out in the end with the "quartet" of French rebel generals.

It may even have been advantageous for the Government to use amphibious blackmail for its own purposes, in particular to expand the prerogatives of the executive branch and infringe on democracy. By calling on Parisians to move if the putschists landed on the airfields, the government tried to knock the initiative out of the hands of left-wing parties and trade unions and prevent the organization of workers. The "crowd" was supposed to act on the direct instructions of the government. One way or another, but the very next day de Gaulle put into effect Article 16 of the Constitution granting him unlimited rights. This step was aimed at mobilizing all means to repel the putschists and unite the forces that opposed the coup around the head of state. On April 23, Metropolitan Police Prefect M. Papon issued an order: "All demonstrations, gatherings and demonstrations are strictly prohibited." 75
In the early morning hours of April 24, the rebel headquarters issued an order from Schall: "From now on, the Algerian armed forces will intensify the fight against the insurgency. I call on you to make a huge effort that should lead us to a rapid peace. " 76 At 8 o'clock. 45 min. A new rebel report on the situation in France has emerged: "While calm and confidence prevail throughout Algeria, Paris was gripped by unrest and confusion last night." In response to the accusations of organizing the plastic bomb attacks in Paris, the putschists announced without any hesitation that the explosions were organized by "the Communist Party, the FLN and the government" 77 . However, despite the outward optimism intended for public opinion, a different mood prevailed in the headquarters of the putschists. The expected joining of the entire army stationed in Algeria to the coup did not happen. "Commanders... territorial formations, "Schall stated," wait in complete inactivity, watching who wins. " 78 In the morning, a captain called the putschists 'headquarters and said that" the officers, non-commissioned officers and soldiers of the airfield maintenance unit in Boufarik (near the Algerian capital - I. Ch.) remain loyal to General de Gaulle." Rallies in support of the head of state were held in the barracks. In the evening of the same day, in the barracks of the Zouave regiment stationed in Algiers, the soldiers also held a rally in defense of the government, and the arriving paratrooper captain, who encouraged them to join the putsch, was chased away. At 20: 30, a truck with armed para soldiers drove up to the gate of the Zouave regiment barracks, which came across a barricade of heavy trucks. The paratroopers turned back 79 .

There was no consensus at the coup headquarters. Schall was a supporter of a purely military action. Salan and Zhuo pushed for greater involvement of "civilians" and a more open politicization of the movement. At the same time, they did not hide their own political plans. Schall issued a statement saying that the coup was primarily aimed at defeating the FLN and "pacifying" Algeria. He rejected the accusation that the coup was political in nature and stressed that "none of the military leaders has personal political ambitions, like the army as a whole." This statement caused dissatisfaction with Salan, who at the evening meeting of the headquarters began to put pressure on Schall, urging him to organize the first mass demonstration of the European population of the Algerian capital in support of the coup. In the evening, crowds of" blackfeet " on

74 J. Fauvet, J. Planchais. Op. cit., pp. 222, 213.

75 "Le Monde", 25.IV.1961.

76 Ibid.

77 Ibid.

78 "Le proces des generaux Challe et Zeller", p. 42.

79 "Le Monde", 27.IV.1961.

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at the call of the radio, the rebels rushed to the Forum, the central square of Algiers, where they demonstrated unity with the military putschists .80
On the same day, accomplices of the putschists made provocative attacks in the metropolis. In the morning, the deputies of the National Assembly received letters from the "SLA Section for Monitoring the work of the Parliament". After claiming that "General de Gaulle's power has come to an end", the letter contained an ultimatum demand "not to mislead public opinion with speeches, statements, and votes", that is, to refrain from any criticism of the putsch. "If you don't have the intention or the courage to welcome General de Gaulle's departure, be quiet. Everything you write will be read; everything you say, even on the sidelines or in your constituencies, will be heard. You will be held severely accountable for your actions."81 The letter was clearly provocative in nature and was intended to cause a psychosis of fear among parliamentarians, and to create an impression among the public about the omnipotence of the SLA and the Algerian putschists.

At the same time, the ultra-right organization "Resistance for Democracy and Freedom" (RDL) took the side of the rebels. Its statement stressed that it acts "in close communication with the Algerian headquarters in defense of democracy and freedom within the framework of the constitution against the personal dictatorship (of de Gaulle) supported by the Popular Front, the Tunisian FLN, Moscow, London and Washington." This absurd statement ended with direct threats to the democratic forces: "The RDL will respond to the blackmail of communist trade unions and other left-wing anti-national forces by all means, the effectiveness of which has already been demonstrated. All metropolitan centers can be paralyzed in 24 hours. " 82 However, the ultra's pathetic threats were drowned out by a powerful protest movement against the Algerian putschists and their accomplices in the metropolis, which unfolded on April 24. On this day, at the call of the PCF and other left-wing parties and trade unions, more than 12 million workers and employees went on a general strike. It was accompanied, despite the bans of the authorities, by mass rallies and demonstrations. It was the largest general political strike in French history. In Paris alone, about 3 million people were involved in the protest campaign. The cry of "Couple to the gallows!"could be heard everywhere .83
The popular response in the mother country had a profound impact on rebellious Algeria, which had experienced dejection and panic since April 24. The Times ' Paris correspondent in London, E. Bar, had every reason to say that in the conditions of indecision that gripped the highest French administration in those days, "de Gaulle was actually saved this time by the trade unions, including the Communist-led General Confederation of Labor"84 . Thanks to the increased activity and organization of the masses of the people, led by the democratic forces, the de Gaulle government significantly intensified the fight against the putschists. Far-right activists were arrested across the country: in Lyon-40 people, Marseille - 20, Grenoble-5, Saint-Etienne-5, Bordeaux-3, etc. 85 . Paramilitary "civil defense and support groups for General de Gaulle" began to form, made up mostly of members of the ruling Gaullist party of the UNR. Measures to defend the capital were strengthened: tanks were introduced into it, and the country's air defense commander, General L. Delfino, a former pilot of the Normandy - Niemen air regiment that fought on the side of the USSR during World War II, took measures to protect the airspace of Paris.

And in the Rignot quarter of Algiers, where the coup headquarters were located, the gloom grew. "On the evening of the 24th," noted Schall, " despite the enthusiasm of the Algerian population, I begin to feel that our campaign has declined." "The enthusiasm of the crowd at the Forum," Salan admitted, "did not dispel my doubts." 86
80 "Le Monde", 26, 27.IV.1961.

81 "L'Organisation armee secrete". Т. 2. P. 1963, p. 5.

82 "Le Monde", 25.IV.1961.

83 J. Fauvet, J. Planсhais. Op. cit., p. 223.

84 Ed. Behr. The Algerian Problem. L. 1962, p. 188.

85 "Le Monde", 25.IV.1961.

86 "Le proces des generaux Challe et Zeller", p. 42; "Le proces du general Raoul Salan", p. 81.

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The only successful action of the putschists over the past day, if it can be considered as such, was the arrest of de Pouilly, who refused to join the putsch. On April 25, it became clear that the denouement was coming. The Government, under pressure from the democratic forces, took urgent measures to eliminate the coup. The 16th Infantry Division was sent to Paris. In Offenburg (Germany), on the orders of the commander of the French troops in West Germany, General Crepin, Colonel Dufour, one of the main accomplices of the putschists, was arrested. In the morning, an official message from the Ministry of the Armed Forces appeared: "The government has called troops and tank units from Germany to Paris to prevent possible actions by rebel elements. The population of the eastern regions of France should not be concerned about the movement of these troops. " 87 In a message to French troops in Algeria, Minister of War P. Messmer, who had returned from Morocco the day before, called on them to " show loyalty to the legitimate government and carry out only its orders." "Transport and air defense aircraft must arrive on the territory of the metropolis in any favorable case, in compliance with the rules of ordinary air flights"; for his part, General Fourke demanded that the Air Force units: "No order of the rebel command should be obeyed." 88
After taking these measures, paratroopers in Algeria tried to seize airfields and prevent the aircraft from taking off, for which they in some cases blocked the runways with trucks and tractors. Nevertheless, at the risk of their lives, the pilots lifted the cars into the air. During April 24, that is, even before Messmer's directive, 14 military aircraft left the airfields of Algeria, and 44 aircraft left on April 25. Thus, two-thirds of the transport aviation and a significant part of the fighter aircraft were relocated to the southern coast of France .89 For the putschists, this was a serious psychological blow. On April 24, at 18 hours, the French Mediterranean squadron, consisting of the aircraft carrier Arromanche and the destroyers Provencal, Basque, Breton, Agenet and Bourdonnais, headed for Algeria. A little later, it was joined by the cruiser "Colbert" 90 .

The putschists made one last attempt to change the situation in their favor. Early in the morning of April 25, Schall sent a 14-truck paratrooper squad led by Colonel Lecomte to Mers-el-Kabir (a French Naval base) to capture the base, which was of strategic importance. The commander of the Mediterranean fleet, who was on board the cruiser Meillet-Breze, gave the order to open fire as soon as the column of putschists appeared at 9 o'clock. 15 min. at the base gate. The cruiser Georges Leige, which was also in the roadstead of Mers-el-Kabir, also opened fire. After a few shots, the column of paratroopers dispersed and hurriedly retreated .91 At 11.30 am. Admiral Kervil left the cruiser and returned to base. At 4 p.m., the Prime Minister told the National Assembly: "The navy fired to prevent the rebels from entering Mers al-Kabir. So it will be everywhere in Algeria and the mother country, where the coup authors will try to show their ambitions. " 92
After an unsuccessful attempt to capture Mers-el-Kabir, the putschists decide to evacuate Oran. At noon, Gardi and Argu left the city, followed by the last detachments of the putschists. Units of the 12th Infantry Division loyal to the government entered Oran. In Constantin, Guro, realizing that things were going badly for the putschists, changed his position again. At 14 o'clock. he signed a new order: "I believe that it is the duty of all, and especially of the armed forces, to unite under the legitimate authority of the head of State." But this action was too late. On April 24, de Gaulle sent Gouraud a telegram: "Your position is unacceptable. Discipline and honor are inseparable. Whatever the difficulties, you must resolutely refuse to carry out the orders of the illegal authorities. " 93
87 "Le Monde", 28.IV.1961.

88 "Le Figaro", 26.IV.1961.

89 J. Fauvet, J. Planсhais. Op. cit., pp. 230 - 231. 9

90 "Le Monde", 26, 27.IV.1961.

91 "L'Express", N 515, 27.IV. 1961; "Le Figaro", 26.IV. 1961.

92 "Journal officiel de la Republique Frangaise. Debats parlementaires. Assemblee Nationale", 26.IV.1961, p. 511.

93 J. Fauvet, J. Planсhais. Op. cit., pp. 235, 220 - 221.

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Meanwhile, panic was growing in the Algerian capital. All traces of recent enthusiasm had vanished from Schall's staff. Generals Bigot, A. Petit, Mantra, and Lennuyer were gathered in his reception room. They had come here to persuade Shallem to stop fighting. They were supported by Colonel de Boissier. But Schall himself knew that the case was lost. Sensing his hesitation, Salan and Zhuo sent Suzini to him, to whom the general still promised to continue fighting. However, as soon as Suzini left the office of the "commander-in-chief", the pessimism gripped him again .94 "At noon, I realized that the case was lost," he will say later in court. "I have assembled officers whose calmness and maturity I know, and sent Colonel de Boissier to Paris on a mission to convey to the Government that I am ready to appear before them. I extended my assessment of the situation to Zhuo, Salan, and Zeller. Then I gathered the commanders of the units stationed in the capital and announced my decision to them." Salant, Jouot, Bruise, Gard, Godard, and de la Chapelle insisted on continuing the resistance. Salan said that if the coup was defeated as an action of the military, it should pass into the hands of "civilians", that is, the Algerian ultra, and demanded the arming of "blackfeet" volunteers by disarming units that refused to join the coup. "At no price could I become an accomplice of General de Gaulle in the murder of French Algeria and its surrender to the enemy," 95 Salan said at the trial.

However, Schall had already made up his mind. "The game is lost because it was badly started," 96 he told his accomplices. Then he wrote a letter to President de Gaulle. Zeller supported Schall's decision. Some of the generals tried to do something else. At 21 o'clock, Zhuo gave the order to mobilize the "blackfeet" in the territorial militia. But this action was too late. Tank units of the mobile gendarmerie and contingent units began to gradually occupy the city, moving towards the center. At 23: 30. A plane carrying a messenger from Shall landed at the Parsay-Melay airfield near Tours. De Boissier placed the letter addressed to de Gaulle in the hands of Julien, Prefect of the Department of Endre-et - Loire, who telegraphed its contents to Paris 97 .

At 23 hours, the rebel radio called on the population of Algiers to rally at the Forum. A few minutes later, crowds of "blackfeet" rushed in, many of them armed. Four silhouettes appeared on the balcony of the General Delegation, greeted the crowd, and disappeared into the building; they were the leaders of the putsch, Schall, Salan, Zhuo, and Zeller. The Blackfeet and the rebels saw their leaders for the last time. By midnight, the crowd had dispersed. At 23 h. 28 min. the same female voice that called the population to the Forum read out the following message:: "This is France-V. Our broadcasts are being resumed. We are asking the population to return to their homes." Then de Gaulle's directives 98 were read out . Government troops occupied the radio station building. At 0 o'clock. 45 min. On April 26, Radio Paris broadcast a message from the Ministry of Information: "Ex-General Schall has informed the Government of his intention to bring himself to justice."

At the same time, Schall, Salan, and Zhuo, wearing the green berets of the Foreign Legion, boarded the truck of the 1st Parachute Regiment. Their retinue of 40 people intended to leave with them. However, the lieutenant accompanying the generals told them: "There are too many people. I only take the military. The rest of us can choose for ourselves." Godard told the ubiquitous reporters,"All I have to do is put a bullet in my head." 99 But it was only a temporary depression for him. In a short time, France will again hear about the atrocities of the former colonel, who will become one of the leaders of the SLA. On the way to Zeralda, where the headquarters of the 1st Para Regiment was located, Salan and Zhuo disappeared together (soon they became the head of the SLA and do

94 P. Demаret, C. Plume. Op. cit." pp. 91 - 92.

95 "Le. proces des generaux Challe et Zeller", p. 42; "Le proces du general Raoul Salan", pp. 88 - 89, 82.

96 J. Fauvet, J. Planсhais. Op. cit., p. 237.

97 "Le Figaro", 27.IV.1961; "Le Monde", 27.IV.1961.

98 J. Fauvet, J. Planсhais. Op. cit., pp. 242 - 243.

99 "Le Monde", 27.IV.1961; J. Fauvet, J. Planсhais. Op. cit., p. 243

100 Y. Courriere. La guerre d'Algerie. T. 4. Les feux du desespoir. P. 1971, p. 360.

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after being arrested in the spring of 1962, they continued their bloody activities) 101 . At parting, Schall gave Zhuo 300 thousand francs to finance subversive operations. After spending the night with the legionnaires, in the morning Schall was taken to Paris and imprisoned in the Sante prison. On May 6, he will be joined by ex-General Zeller, who also surrendered to the authorities. At 5.30 am. On April 26, a telegram was received in Paris: "The General Government is free. Legality restored " 102 .

Thus ended ingloriously the military putsch prepared by the reactionary military in alliance with colonialist circles. In its statement of April 26, the Central Committee of the PCF rightly emphasized that "the failure of the military-fascist putsch is a victory for the people of France."103 It was the millions of ordinary Frenchmen, led by leftist parties and trade unions, who played a decisive role in defeating the putschists, as the leaders of the rebellion themselves admitted. Schall, for example, stated in his speech at the trial that from the very beginning he was confronted with the indifference and hostility of the civilian population; "the second reason for our defeat, and this was a great surprise to me, was that the troops turned out to have developed and organized communist cells; they seemed to be everywhere."104 . The moral isolation, isolation, and hostility of the rebel plans to the national interests of the French people ultimately determined their defeat.

One of the most important consequences of the April coup was the political discredit of the military. "The army," Gambiez, the former commander - in - chief of the French forces in Algeria, said at the trial, " came out of this case defeated... It has lost the trust of the civil authorities, and perhaps the trust of the entire nation. " 105 On the other hand, the defeat of the coup was a testament to the power and influence of progressive forces, the depth and strength of the Republican, democratic traditions of the French people. As for Algeria, the "Secret Armed Organization" formed there by the reaction tried to continue the struggle for the preservation of the colonial regime. However, it was also a complete failure: On July 1, 1962, the Algerian people voted for their independence.

101 См. "Le proces du general Raoul Salan"; "Le. proces du d'Edmont Pouhaud. Compte rendu stenographique". P. 1962.

102 P. Demaret, C. Plume. Op. cit., p. 92.

103 "L'Humanite", 26.IV.1961.

104 "Le proces des generaux Challe et Zeller", p. 43.

105 Ibid., p. 82.The Military Tribunal sentenced to death (in absentia) Generals R. Salan, E. Zhuo, P. Gardi, Colonels A. Argu, J. Bruaz, J. Gard, I. Godard, S. Lacheroy. Generals M. Schall, A. Zeller and P.-M. Bigot received 15 years in prison; General J.-L. Nicot - 12; Major D. de Saint-Marc-10; Colonels Masselot and Lecomte-8; General M.-M. Gouraud and Colonel Sh. de la Chapelle - 7; Colonel J-Roban-6; General A. Petit-5; 34 people were sentenced to probation.

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